Abstract

[Abstract(Law)] An Analysis of promoting consent decision in competition law

  • DATE WRITTEN : 2022-02-08
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The system in which a suspected undertaking under investigation or deliberation voluntarily suggests to the KFTC a corrective plan before receiving sanctions after MRFTA and the KFTC closes the case when it accepts such voluntary measure. It is called the consent decision system. The consent decision has some advantages such as securing rapid means of public execution and the efficiency of resource allocation through flexibility in implementing the law.

Therefore, it is necessary to make to close cases by means of consents, especially cases of M&A with corrective conditions, cases where market definition or relevant sales calculation are technically difficult, cases where victims are SME, and subcontract payment. To do this, first of all, it is necessary to overcome the view that consent decision is an unfair indulgence by the KFTC. In addition, the process of collecting opinions against voluntary corrective measures from stakeholders should be regarded seriously so that the consent decision reflecting various opinions can be constructed.

Moreover, efforts are needed to specify control measures for consent decisions. In particular, it is necessary to reflect on whether the establishment of damage relief funds and foundations played a practical role despite being an important means of relieving damage to a small number of consumers, and it will be important to supplement future performance management procedures and controls for inappropriate performance. Fortunately, the procedure for managing the implementation of consent decisions was introduced by legislation last year. I hope it works better.

Tae Hi Hwang
(Professor, Sungshin Women University Law School)

[Journal of Korean Competition Law, Vol. 44, September 2021]
      
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